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ABSTRACT 
 
The SEC has proposed proxy access rules in the wake of the recent 
financial crisis. With the stated purpose of removing impediments to the 
exercise of shareholder voice and increasing director accountability, the 
proposed rule changes are not without problems. The proposed rules enter 
a mix in which the corporate governance landscape, shaped by powerful 
role players, already presents troubling possibilities for activist 
shareholder abuse. This Article argues that adoption of the proposed rules 
could be the final piece to a puzzle in which shareholder power is 
achieved at the expense of long-term corporate health and shareholder 
value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
proposed changes to the federal proxy rules.1 Specifically, by proposing a 
new rule in Rule 14a-11 and an amendment to Rule 14a-8,2 the SEC took 
steps towards giving shareholders a greater voice in corporate 
governance.3 This contentious topic, raised in the wake of a serious 
economic crisis, has engendered lively debate from scholars, practitioners, 
and interest groups on both sides of the issue.4  
According to the SEC, the economic crisis has raised “serious 
concerns about the accountability and responsiveness of some companies 
and boards of directors to the interests of shareholders, and has resulted in 
a loss of investor confidence.”5 As a result, the SEC proposed these rule 
changes to remove impediments to “the ability of shareholders to hold 
boards accountable through the exercise of their fundamental right to 
nominate and elect members to company boards of directors.”6   
The means by which proxy access is presumed to enhance director 
accountability is by enabling shareholders to assume a greater role in 
director elections.7 It does so by removing the cost that would otherwise 
be incurred by a shareholder preparing his or her own expensive proxy 
materials featuring candidates of his or her choosing.8 Enabling 
shareholders to nominate directors inexpensively would thus enhance 
director accountability by providing a real threat that an incumbent 
director may be removed from the board. 
Although praised by some, these changes give others unease.9 It is 
appropriate, therefore, to revisit the current landscape of corporate 
                                                 
1 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,024 
(Jun. 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
2 Proposed Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8 are not the only proposed rule changes in the 
SEC’s effort to facilitate shareholder access in board elections; however, they are the two 
most relevant to the scope of this paper. See id. (describing other rules regarding 
shareholder access in board elections).  
3 See id. (proposing changes to “remove impediments to the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights to … elect … boards of directors”). 
4 This is evidenced by the fact that the SEC saw fit to re-open the comment period in 
early 2010. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 
67,144 (Dec. 18, 2009) (comments were due on January 19, 2010). 
5 Id. at 29,025. 
6 Id. 
7 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Delaware’s New Proxy Access: Much Ado About Nothing?, 11 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 87, 91 (2009). 
8 Id. at 91-92.  
9 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
138 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:135 
 
 
governance in America. This Article argues that upon close examination 
of corporate governance provisions already in place at many public 
corporations, current SEC rules, the role played by proxy advisory firms, 
and the composition of the shareholder group and its members’ behavior, 
it becomes clear that the proposed rules are, at worst, threatening to long-
term corporate health and, at best, unwise. 
Part I explains what the SEC’s proposed Rules provide and why they 
are perceived, by some, as necessary. Part II examines the current 
corporate governance landscape, including the major role players and 
prevalent corporate governance provisions. Part III discusses why giving 
greater power and a louder voice to shareholders in a climate in which 
opportunities for abuse already exist is threatening to the long-term health 
of corporations. 
 
I. PROPOSED SEC RULES FOR FACILITATING SHAREHOLDER DIRECTOR 
NOMINATIONS 
 
A. Provisions in the Proposed Rules 
 
Proposed new Rule 14a-11 would, if adopted, “require companies to 
include disclosure about shareholder nominees for director in company 
proxy materials” under certain circumstances.10 The certain circumstances 
to which the proposed Rule refers act as a limitation; Rule 14a-11 would 
allow a shareholder or shareholder group to avail itself of the Rule only if 
the shareholder beneficially owns a specified percentage of the registrant’s 
outstanding stock and has owned the stock for at least one year.11 In 
explaining the necessity for the new Rule, the SEC noted that because 
public corporations have dispersed ownership, “director elections are 
largely conducted by proxy rather than in person and, as a result, 
impediments that the Federal proxy rules create to shareholders 
nominating directors through the proxy process translate into the inability 
                                                                                                                         
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653 (2010) (arguing that the 
“financial crisis exposes major weakness in the shareholder empowerment case”). 
10 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,032. 
11 Id. at 29,035. The requirement pertaining to amount of shares owned varies 
depending on the size of the company, measured in assets. Id. For example, nominating 
shareholders need only own 1 percent of a company with net assets of $700 million or 
more. Id. Alternatively, for companies with net assets of $75 million or more, the 
nominating shareholder(s) must own 3 percent of the company’s stock. Id. 
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of shareholders to effectively exercise their rights to nominate and to elect 
those directors.”12  
In addition to new Rule 14a-11, the SEC has also proposed an 
amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which would  
 
preclude companies from relying on [provisions in current] Rule 
14a-8(i)(8) to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder 
proposals by qualifying shareholders that would amend, or that 
request an amendment to, a company’s governing documents 
regarding nomination procedures or disclosures related to 
shareholder nominations, provided the proposal does not conflict 
with proposed Rule 14a-11.13 
 
Under the text of the proposed amendment, proposals may only be 
excluded as relating to director elections if the proposal “[w]ould 
disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; [w]ould remove a 
director from office before his or her term expired; [or] [q]uestions the 
competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or 
directors ….”14 Again, the justification for this amendment appears to be 
that the “election exclusion” relied upon in current Rule 14-8 has operated 
as an impediment to the exercise of shareholder voice. 
 
B. Why These Changes? Why Now? 
 
As mentioned above,15 accountability is a central theme underlying the 
current attempts at reform. In the shareholder proponent camp, Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk maintains that “[s]hareholder power to remove directors 
is supposed to provide a mechanism for ensuring that directors are well 
chosen and have incentives to serve shareholder interests once chosen.”16 
Arguing that impediments under the current system preclude the exercise 
of this important shareholder power, Bebchuk claims that adopting the 
proposed rules would “improve director accountability.”17 In contrast, 
                                                 
12 Id. at 29,031. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 29,058 (internal citations omitted). 
15 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
16 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 675, 677 (2007)[hereinafter, Bebchuk, Myth of the Shareholder Franchise]. 
17 Letter from Lucian A. Bebchuk, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commision (Aug. 17, 2009) 
(Comment Letter of a Bi-Partisan Group of Eighty Professors of Law, Business, 
Economics, or Finance in Favor of Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60089). 
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proponents of maintaining the status quo argue that adopting the proposed 
rules would create “[a] shareholder-based agency model of the corporation 
[that] sends ... a simple instruction: in all circumstances, manage to 
maximize the market price of the stock.”18 
 This has proved to be a divisive issue,  as the proposed rules would 
increase shareholder voice, at least to the extent of creating an in terrorem 
effect in the boardroom.19 Therefore, it is imperative to re-examine the 
current landscape of corporate governance in order to ascertain whether 
these rules are beneficial, or, on the other hand, menacing for corporate 
health and inimical to long-term shareholder value.  
 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 
 
A. Prevalent Provisions at Public Companies 
 
1. Majority Voting 
 
Under Delaware law,20 elections to the board of directors are decided 
by a plurality of the vote, that is, the director(s) receiving the most votes 
are elected.21 However, this provision may be altered by way of a bylaw 
amendment adopted by the shareholders, which may “specif[y] the votes 
that shall be necessary for the election of directors.”22 When such an 
amendment is passed, the standard is typically set at a majority threshold, 
meaning that a director must receive a majority of the votes cast in order 
to be elected.23 As Claudia Allen notes, majority voting “has become the 
                                                 
18 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 658-59. 
19 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833, 878 (2005) (“Introducing the power to intervene would induce management 
to act differently in order to avoid shareholder intervention.”) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter, Bebchuk, Case for Increasing Shareholder Power]. 
20 Although provisions may vary by state, for simplicity’s sake, the widespread 
incorporation of companies in Delaware encourages analysis of Delaware law. See Faith 
Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (2009) (stating that “the consensus among 
scholars, commentators, and practicing lawyers” is that “Delaware has won” as the most 
important state for corporate law issues).  
21 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. viii, § 216(3) (2010) (“Directors shall be elected by a 
plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the 
meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors.”).  
22 Id.  
23 See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, Nov. 12, 
2007, at 1, available at http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  
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prevailing election standard among large public companies.”24 Indeed, the 
Allen study indicates that “66% of the companies in the S&P 500 and over 
57% of the companies in the Fortune 500 have adopted a form of majority 
voting.”25 Allen also states that this practice is not limited to large 
companies, but that “majority voting has been adopted by mid-cap, small-
cap and some micro-cap companies.”26 
This shift in the conduct of director elections begs the question 
whether majority voting is beneficial or harmful to shareholder interests 
and value. David Porter, a former partner of a prominent law firm, regards 
majority voting “as a concept of good governance and shareholder 
democracy.”27 Nonetheless, Porter fears an in terrorem effect in which 
directors must concern themselves with placating shareholders in order to 
be re-elected each year.28 Porter states that such fears could well lead to 
directors focusing on short-term strategies.29 Calling upon his 
“experiences in practice,” Porter instructs that “an undue focus on short-
term strategies will usually result in poor strategies and outcome for the 
long-term.”30 
Is the adoption of majority voting, by itself, reason for incumbent 
boards to be concerned? Probably not. A director failing to receive a 
majority vote in an uncontested election would be a rare occurrence.31 
However, when considered in conjunction with other corporate 
governance provisions, a threatening mix is brewed. Porter, who believes 
that majority voting is a matter of good corporate governance, 
nevertheless predicted that majority voting could become much more 
threatening to incumbent directors if broker discretionary voting rules 
were to change.32 The broker discretionary voting rules have since been 
amended. To explain the resulting situation, a discussion of this factor, and 
its relation to majority voting, follows. 
 
                                                 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 David P. Porter, Institutional Investors and Their Role in Corporate Governance: 
Reflections by a “Recovering” Corporate Governance Lawyer, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
627, 627, 666 (2009) (Porter was a partner at Jones Day in Cleveland, Ohio). 
28 Id. at 666. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 663 (“[E]very director in the history of virtually every corporation in 
America has always received enough votes to be elected under the majority voting 
standard.”). 
32 Id. at 663-64. 
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2. Amendment to Broker Discretionary Voting Rules 
 
In July of 2009, the SEC approved a rule change proposed by the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that “eliminate[d] broker discretionary 
voting for the election of directors” because elections of directors would 
no longer be considered a “routine” matter for which instructions from the 
beneficial owners of stock are not required.33 Prior to the rule change, 
brokers were permitted to vote without receiving “voting instructions from 
the beneficial owner on uncontested elections of directors.”34 Under the 
new regime, brokers may not vote without receiving instructions from the 
beneficial owner for any director election, whether uncontested or 
contested.35  
The result is clear: if one accepts the premise that many retail 
investors—individuals and not institutional investors—will not give 
voting instructions to their brokers, fewer votes will be cast for incumbent 
directors.36 This may present problems in both contested and uncontested 
director elections.  
It may appear surprising that a director could lose an election when 
running unopposed. However, a 2004 director election for the Walt Disney 
Company is illustrative. In that election, had broker votes “not been 
counted, then CEO and board chair Michael Eisner would have received 
only 45 percent of the votes in favor of his reelection ....”37 When coupled 
with the majority voting provision in place at many corporations, this 
example makes clear that these two factors, working in tandem, could 
result in a director losing in an uncontested election. 
With respect to contested elections, the possibilities are more troubling 
for incumbent directors. When a shareholder, or a group thereof, 
nominates a dissident slate of directors to be elected, their chances of 
success are greatly increased because, as mentioned above, retail investor 
                                                 
33 Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC; Order Approving 
Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 4, To Amend NYSE Rule 452 
and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 To Eliminate Broker 
Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, Except for Companies Registered 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and To Codify Two Previously Published 
Interpretations That Do Not Permit Broker Discretionary Voting for Material 
Amendments to Investment Advisory Contracts With an Investment Company, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 33,293, 33,293-94 (July 10, 2009). 
34  Id. at 33,293. 
35  Id. 
36 Fairfax, supra note 7, at 99 (“Brokers’ voting overwhelmingly follows the 
recommendation of incumbent boards.”). 
37 Id.  
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votes—which hitherto would have often been voted by brokers in favor of 
incumbents—may not be available for incumbent directors. This problem 
would only be exacerbated by facilitating shareholder director 
nominations under SEC proposed Rule 14a-11. As corporate lawyer Laura 
Richman points out, “[i]f the SEC adopts [Rule 14a-11] … the impact of 
lowered retail vote returns may be coupled with a large shareholder or 
shareholder group supporting its own nominee.”38 The result is clear: 
incumbent directors may lose, and retail investors will witness a change in 
the composition of those managing their investment, all without having 
voiced their approval or opposition. 
 
B. The Role Players 
 
1. Activist Institutional Investors 
 
Institutional investors now comprise a majority of all shareholders in 
publicly-traded companies.39 However, activism among institutional 
shareholders is typically identified with hedge funds. This is so because 
hedge funds have more of an incentive to participate actively than do 
mutual funds.40 Hedge fund managers are paid a fee based on fund 
performance,41 whereas managers of other institutional investors, such as 
mutual funds, are prohibited by statute from receiving incentive-based 
pay.42 Thus, hedge funds engage “in active corporate monitoring because 
the structure of their compensation provides their managers with a direct 
financial incentive to do so.”43  
Scholars and practitioners alike debate with great force whether hedge 
funds’ active monitoring is beneficial or detrimental to shareholders 
generally. Those with a hostile view of hedge funds describe them as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
38 Laura D. Richman, Amendment of NYSE Rule 452: Elimination of Broker 
Discretionary Voting in Director Elections (July 1, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/ 
publications/article.asp?id=7172. 
39 John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: 
Why “Exit” Works Better Than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 416-17 (2008). 
40 Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap 
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 225, 231 (2007). 
41 Id. at 231. 
42 Id. at 318 (explaining that “§205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisors Act prohibits” 
mutual fund “managers from receiving compensation” based on “capital gains … of the 
funds”). 
43 Id. at 231. 
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These are impatient shareholders, who look for value and want it 
realized in the near or immediate term. Their strategy is to tell 
managers how to realize that value and to challenge publicly those 
who resist their advice, using the proxy contest as a threat …. 
[They] act out a game of threat and resistance in which victory lies 
in either the insurgent’s entry into the boardroom on a minority 
basis or the target’s diffusion of the threat with a governance 
concession.44 
 
Commentators with the opposing view champion hedge funds for 
“actively direct[ing] corporate policy” and "resolv[ing] corporate law’s 
fundamental agency problem by reuniting ownership and control.”45 
While the utility of hedge fund activism may be debated, its power 
may not. An illuminating example may be found with regard to hedge 
fund activity in the boardroom at Deutsche Borse. The Deutsche Borse 
board, persuaded by the company’s CEO, had determined to acquire the 
London Stock Exchange; however, a hedge fund holding a 5 percent 
interest in Deutsche Borse, The Children’s Investment Fund Management 
(TCI), opposed the move.46 TCI opposed the move because it felt that the 
funds necessary to acquire the London Stock Exchange would be better 
spent in a stock repurchase.47 After TCI put a plan in motion to have 
Deutsche Borse’s chairman replaced, the company abandoned its bid for 
the London Stock Exchange and committed itself to distributing cash to 
the shareholders.48 This example makes plain the undeniable power hedge 
funds wield. 
The Deutsche Borse example also sheds light on the concern raised 
most often by those who view hedge funds in a negative light, namely that 
hedge funds have a short-term outlook, and thus their interests are 
misaligned with those of shareholders generally. Hedge funds are 
considered, by some, to have a short-term focus because they look for an 
increase in value in the short-term, and they tend to hold stock for less 
time than do retail investors.49 This asymmetry between hedge fund 
interests and the interests of those with a longer-term outlook may lead to 
                                                 
44 William W. Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK. 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 11 (2008). 
45 Illig, supra note 40, at 228-29.  
46 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (2007). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1035-36. 
49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, 
at 1083 (“For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a ‘long-term’ 
investment.”). 
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situations in which short-term capital gains for hedge funds are large, but 
shareholder value generally will be decreased. 
TCI’s intervention at Deutsche Borse illustrates how the misalignment 
of interests could harm long-term value. Without considering the actual 
merits of Deutsche Borse’s proposed bid for the London Stock Exchange, 
assume that the acquisition would have proved to be a wise investment 
and provided shareholders with valuable returns in the long-term. Kahan 
and Rock noted that TCI’s intervention would “have had the effect of 
pushing the company toward the lower value outcome: an outcome worse 
for long-term shareholders than acquiring the LSE.”50  
Illuminating as the Deutsche Borse example is, it merely reaffirms the 
original proposition that hedge funds actively monitor board and 
management decisions. From this point some may argue that hedge fund 
activism creates value by preventing unwise board decisions, while others 
may point to examples in which valuable long-term investments were 
foregone. Whichever side of the story one believes, the ability of hedge 
funds to intervene in the boardroom is an undeniable fact.  
 
2. Proxy Advisory Firms 
 
Proxy advisory services such as RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Glass Lewis 
& Co., and Proxy Governance Inc.51 use “ratings to formulate voting 
recommendations and other governance-rating providers … to advise on 
investment decisions.”52 These firms create a rating index based on what 
they consider to be best practices for corporate governance.53 The firms 
then rate a corporation based on how the company’s corporate governance 
provisions compare to the firm’s ratings index.54 Their power is great, and 
as a result, they have brought change to corporate governance—change 
that is harmful to long-term shareholder value. 
One example of this power can be found with regard to staggered 
boards. Marc Goldstein, the head of research engagements for 
RiskMetrics’s Governance Services unit and a member of the firm’s 
policy board, wrote an article in which he proclaimed that RiskMetrics 
                                                 
50 Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1084. 
51 As RiskMetrics is the industry leader, repeated reference to that firm will be made 
when referring to proxy advisory services generally. See Porter, supra note 27, at 667 
(RiskMetrics is “the most prominent of the proxy advisory services firms.”). 
52 Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of 
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2008). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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advises shareholders to “make certain that the board they empanel will not 
be excessively deferential [to management] by … [i]mproving board 
accountability through the elimination of staggered board elections ….”55 
However, the wisdom of this approach for long-term corporate health is 
questionable. A seasoned corporate attorney declares that “the long-term 
view is more obviously protected by classified boards ... which 
emphasizes a longer time horizon ….”56 Nevertheless, a survey of 
companies to whom proposals to eliminate staggered boards were 
presented in 2006 revealed that forty-five of forty-six supported the 
change.57 While it may be difficult to ascertain how many of those 
companies’ boards were acceding to pressure from a RiskMetrics’s 
advisory opinion, it is fair to presume that RiskMetrics played a role in 
many of the votes.58 
The influence of RiskMetrics is unmistakable.59 However, its influence 
may be most startling with respect to director elections. Institutional 
investors, who rely heavily on RiskMetrics’s recommendations, virtually 
always give directions on how to vote in director elections.60 When 
considered in light of the “lost votes” resulting from changes to NYSE 
Rule 452 in broker discretionary voting, it is clear that RiskMetrics, by 
advising institutional investors, may determine the outcome of many 
director elections.  
In drafting the text of new Rule 14a-11, the SEC made clear that it 
fails to appreciate the influence of RiskMetrics. Subparagraph (a)(1) states 
that the rule’s provisions enabling shareholder nominations are available 
only if “the registrant’s governing documents do not prohibit the 
registrant’s shareholders from nominating a candidate or candidates for 
election as a director.”61 This “power” given to the board to amend the 
charter to prevent the application of 14a-11 is worthless. Given that 
                                                 
55 Marc Goldstein, Mitigating Dysfunctional Deference Through Improvements in 
Board Composition and Board Effectiveness, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 490, 491 
(2009), www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/lawreview/Colloquy/2009/21. 
56 Porter, supra note 27, at 666. 
57 Illig, supra note 40, at 261. 
58 See Porter, supra note 27, at 667 (“[F]or many corporations, it is common wisdom 
that a majority of their institutional shareholders will follow the advisor’s 
recommendations slavishly, and so the outcome of the shareholder proposal may well be 
determined by what position RiskMetrics has taken on the matter.”). 
59 See id. (“[RiskMetrics’] real role in many cases is absolute and determinative, 
rather than merely advisory.”). 
60 Id. at 669. 
61 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,082 (Jun. 
18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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RiskMetrics advocates holding boards accountable through the elimination 
of staggered boards, one can confidently assume that RiskMetrics would 
take a similar stance with regard to a charter amendment that displaces the 
provisions of 14a-11.62 Because institutional investors follow advice 
received from RiskMetrics,63 institutional investors are likely to be able to 
rip such a limiting provision from a corporate charter as fast as the 
directors can place it there.64 The SEC has thus proven itself incapable of 
understanding the powerful influence of proxy advisory services. 
The prospect of RiskMetrics determining the outcome of director 
elections is troubling for long-term shareholder value when one realizes 
that much of what RiskMetrics advises may not be in the best interests of 
the long-term health of a company.65 However, a final adoption of the 
SEC’s proposed rule changes will only enhance the influence of 
RiskMetrics and other proxy advisory firms as institutional investors will 
have greater access to the company’s proxy materials. 
 
3. The Phenomenon of “Borrowed Shares” 
 
Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard Black published an article describing the 
practice of, and problems arising from, borrowing shares in a 
corporation.66 An individual “borrows” shares by finding a shareholder 
willing to “lend” the shares.67 The transaction results in the “borrower” 
acquiring the voting rights connected to the shares, while the lender retains 
the economic interest in the corporation whose stock has been borrowed.68 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, share borrowing is practiced to a large degree by 
hedge funds.69 This “decoupling” of voting rights from economic interests 
presents problems for the outcome of director elections. A hedge fund 
nominating a slate of directors for election may borrow shares on or 
shortly before the record date, “reverse the transaction” afterwards, and 
                                                 
62 See RiskMetrics Group U.S. Policy, http://www.riskmetrics.com/policy_exchange/ 
policy_detail?param1=rmgus&param2=board&param3=annual (last visited Nov. 16, 
2010) (RiskMetrics promotes voting for proposals to repeal staggered or classified 
boards).  
63 Porter, supra note 27, at 667. 
64 See Bratton, supra note 44, at 11 (noting that hedge funds exercise their power to 
exact governance concessions). 
65 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
66 See Bernard Black & Henry T. C. Hu, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 811-12 (2006) (abstract). 
67 Id. at 816. 
68 Id. at 818. 
69 Id. at 819. 
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wield greater voting power in the election.70 Aside from the outward 
unfairness of the arrangement, this practice undermines the traditional 
fabric of corporate law wherein voting power is “proportional to economic 
ownership.”71 
It is worth noting that proposed Rule 14a-11 does include a provision 
that could prevent some abuses by hedge funds that borrow shares. In 
order for a shareholder to avail itself of 14a-11, the shareholder must have 
beneficially owned a percentage of outstanding shares for at least one 
year.72 Although this one-year provision would reduce the utility of 
borrowing shares by disallowing a nomination by an opportunistic 
shareholder that increases its holdings to the specified amount on or 
shortly before the record date, it would not extinguish the utility entirely. 
Because the one-year requirement applies only to the nominating 
shareholder,73 nothing prevents like-minded institutional investors from 
borrowing shares to vote in favor of the dissident slate. Similarly, a hedge 
fund that already satisfies the threshold ownership percentage required to 
nominate a director could conceivably still borrow shares to wield greater 
voting power. 
Moreover, hedge funds need not actually engage in share borrowing to 
effect change, as the mere threat of doing so would produce an in terrorem 
effect on incumbent boards to accede to hedge fund demands.74 When one 
considers that the aim of hedge funds can conflict with sound long-term 
corporate decision-making,75 the risks posed by share borrowing are 
brought to light.  
 
III. A PERFECT STORM FOR SHAREHOLDER POWER 
 
Having laid the foundation for analyzing the current landscape of 
corporate governance and share ownership, it is now possible to 
understand why the final adoption of proposed SEC Rules 14a-11 and 
14a-8 is unwise. To revisit the issue, director accountability in the wake of 
the recent financial crisis has been given as the justification for proxy 
reform.76 As one member of the pro-shareholder camp puts it, 
 
                                                 
70 Id. at 816-17. 
71 Id. at 811. 
72 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
75 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
76 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
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the most effective way to ensure that directors remain focused on 
shareholder value—and do not become overly deferential to 
management—is to establish a credible means for voting them out 
of office. For this reason, majority voting for directors, 
declassification of boards, and “proxy access” … are shaping up as 
key issues for investors and regulators alike as they seek ways to 
enhance accountability and to prevent a reoccurrence of the 
financial market meltdown.77 
 
This statement, notably made by Marc Goldstein, an officer of 
RiskMetrics,78 touches upon many of the aforementioned topics. It does so 
by claiming that the listed provisions are necessary to enhance 
accountability and shareholder value.79 This claim is mistaken. What 
Goldstein and others point to as the solution to a problem is better 
understood as the inner-workings of a corporate governance machination 
that threatens long-term corporate health, and by extension, shareholder 
value. 
The topics discussed in Part II are surprisingly intertwined and 
combine like pieces of a puzzle to create a picture in which shareholder 
power is rising. The adoption of proposed SEC Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11 
could be the final piece to the puzzle80 in which shareholders achieve 
power at the expense of long-term corporate health and shareholder value. 
The interconnection of the factors discussed can be explained as 
follows: hedge funds, with the guidance of proxy advisory firms,81 can 
shape corporate decision making from their activist stance,82 and affect 
director elections by borrowing shares.83 Their power to affect director 
elections is increased by the widespread adoption of majority voting84 and 
the amendment to NYSE Rule 452.85 This power will increase with the 
final adoption of SEC proposed Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8.86 It is thus 
inescapable that when the SEC states its desire to empower shareholders 
                                                 
77 See Goldstein, supra note 55, at 499.  
78 Marc Goldstein is an employee of RiskMetrics Group in Rockville, Maryland. See 
RiskMetrics Group, http://www.riskmetrics.com (search “Marc Goldstein”). 
79 See Goldstein, supra note 55, at 499. 
80 See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 91 (“Shareholder advocates have long viewed access 
to the corporation’s proxy statement as the ‘holy grail’ of shareholder rights ….”). 
81 See supra Part II.B.2. 
82 See supra Part II.B.1. 
83 See supra Part II.B.3. 
84 See supra Part II.A.1. 
85See supra Part II.A.2; see also Richman, supra note 38 (“As a result of the 
amendment to Rule 452, companies may need to increase their solicitation efforts ….”).  
86 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
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by way of the proposed rules, it is in reality empowering institutional 
shareholders, particularly hedge funds. The result is a situation in which 
real pressure is placed on incumbent directors who wish to be re-elected.   
When the discussed factors are considered together, two conclusions 
are reached: (1) shareholders currently enjoy sufficient power, such that 
proxy reform is unnecessary; and (2) the increased pressure to be felt by 
directors will lead them, and the management they oversee, to “manage to 
the market” at the expense of long-term corporate health and shareholder 
value.87 
 
A. Further Reform in the Interests of Shareholders is Unnecessary 
 
With the adoption of amended NYSE Rule 452, incumbent directors 
are sure to lose a number of votes in future elections.88 Meanwhile, 
institutional investors will continue to vote.89 When considered alongside 
the adoption of majority voting, institutional investors already have a real 
opportunity to affect the outcome of director elections.90 This is so 
because hedge funds have the ability to defeat an incumbent director by 
way of a “withhold-the-vote” campaign.91 By embarking upon a 
“withhold-the-vote” campaign at a company that has adopted majority 
voting,92 and at the present time when brokers can no longer vote without 
instructions from the beneficial owners,93 the ability for an institutional 
investor or other shareholder to ensure that an incumbent director does not 
receive a majority of votes is very real. Thus, the present mix of factors 
impacting director elections is sufficient for shareholders to hold directors 
accountable, such that adoption of the proposed SEC rules is unnecessary. 
Indeed, even the starry-eyed shareholder proponent Professor Bebchuk 
acknowledges that actual proxy contests, which would be enabled by the 
proposed SEC rules, are unnecessary for shareholders to hold directors 
accountable.94 Instead, the power for shareholders to intervene, he argues, 
ensures that directors consider shareholder interests.95 Because 
shareholders already wield the power to intervene, as described above, 
                                                 
87 See infra Part III.A-B. 
88 See Fairfax, supra note 7, at 99 (“[B]rokers’ voting overwhelmingly follows the 
recommendation of incumbent boards ….”). 
89 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
90 See supra note 37-38 and accompanying text. 
91 Fairfax, supra note 7, at 99. 
92 See supra Part II.A.1. 
93 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
94 Bebchuk, Myth of Shareholder Franchise, supra note 19, at 878. 
95 Id. 
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proxy access is unnecessary to produce the wishes of even its loudest 
proponents. 
 
B. Harm Caused by Managing to the Market 
 
As noted above, a debate rages concerning whether pressure on 
directors is beneficial from an accountability standpoint or detrimental 
from a shortsightedness standpoint.96 However, a close examination of the 
threat that increased shareholder power poses to long-term corporate 
health and shareholder value makes clear that the pendulum has swung too 
far, and proxy reform in the form of the current proposed SEC rules will 
exacerbate the problem. 
When pondering the current corporate governance landscape and the 
proposed SEC rules, one is confronted with the question of whether 
increased shareholder power is beneficial. However, it is important to first 
ask who it is that will be empowered. The answer is hedge funds. Hedge 
funds are the party to benefit most directly because it is they who engage 
in active corporate monitoring.97 As a result, it is imperative to examine 
whether empowering hedge funds is beneficial to shareholders generally. 
Empowering hedge funds will not benefit shareholders generally 
because their interests are misaligned. As Kahan and Rock note, “hedge 
funds are set up to make money for their investors without regard to 
whether the strategies they follow benefit shareholders generally.”98 To 
note the misalignment of interests between hedge funds and shareholders 
generally, consider that “institutional investors flip shares with more 
frequency than retail investors.”99 The divergence of interests is aptly 
pointed out by Lisa Fairfax, who notes, “granting all shareholders access 
to the proxy statement could increase the influence of shareholders with 
narrow or special interests in a manner that could have negative 
repercussions for … shareholders as a whole.”100  
                                                 
96 Compare Bebchuk, Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,  supra note 16, at 677 
(arguing that the power to remove directors ensures director accountability), with John F. 
Olson, Is the Sky Really Falling? Shareholder-Centric Versus Director-Centric 
Corporate Governance, 9 TENN. J. BUS. L. 295, 300 (2008) (arguing that empowering 
shareholders will harm “effective long-range planning”). 
97 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
98 Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1071.  
99 Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 711, 739 (2005); see also Jennifer O’Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 
10b-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 521, 539 (2008) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of retail 
investors follow a buy-and-hold strategy.”). 
100 Fairfax, supra note 7, at 92-93. 
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Therefore, situations may exist in which long-term retail investors are 
harmed because hedge funds “seek to push the corporation into steps 
designed to create a short-term pop in the company’s share price so that 
they can turn a quick profit.”101 Such a situation would be detrimental to 
shareholders generally if the move advocated by the hedge fund created an 
initial surge in share price, but turned out to be a poor investment for the 
company, lowering share price in the long term.  
Having thus explored what effect empowering hedge funds will have 
on other shareholders, it is also important to examine what effect increased 
shareholder access will have on corporations. The principal objection to 
shareholder access is that its adoption will increase pressure on boards of 
directors in a manner that is harmful to long-term corporate health.102 The 
reason for this concern is that the louder the voice of hedge funds, the 
more sensitive boards are to their demands.103 As previously discussed, 
hedge funds may seek near-term increases in share price.104 Thus when 
boards are compelled, as a result of shareholder access, to listen to the 
funds, they become short-termist themselves. A former practitioner voiced 
this concern by pointing out that putting “an undue focus on short-term 
strategies will usually result in poor strategies and outcome [sic] for the 
long-term.”105 He likewise recognizes that this very well could result from 
increased pressure on directors, stating that “if the directors perceive there 
to be a significant risk that the director can’t count on re-election, the 
director’s current long-term outlook may well switch to ‘how do I get re-
elected next year?’”106 With adoption of the proposed SEC rules, this 
result is all the more likely, as “the risk that the director can’t count on re-
election” will surely be magnified in a given year. 
The result is that boards of directors and the management they oversee 
may “manage to the market.”107 Professor Wachter explains why this is a 
problem; “[s]hareholder empowerment will make it much more difficult 
for a good board of directors to resist pressures to manage to the market. 
This can lead to bad business decisions, either due to information 
                                                 
101 Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s 
Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 78 (2003). 
102 Fairfax, supra note 7, at 58 (stating that although increasing shareholder access 
enhances accountability, doing so has negative long term effects on the corporation). 
103 Kahan & Rock, supra note 46, at 1029 (discussing the various levels of hedge 
fund activism from merely suggesting a new business strategy up to instigating 
litigation). 
104 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
105 Porter, supra note 27, at 666.  
106 Id. 
107 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 690.  
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asymmetry or a run of speculative mispricing.”108 Further, complications 
for corporate investment policy “arise when managers manage to the 
market, factoring expected stock price[s] … into their decisions …. [T]he 
risk of underpricing [sic] may lead management to pass up [a good] 
opportunity.”109 
To illustrate the problem, Wachter offers the recent financial crisis as 
an example. Countrywide Financial, who wrote risky mortgages in the 
subprime sector during the mid 2000s saw its share price soar, while 
JPMorgan, who never entered the industry to any great extent, witnessed a 
lagging stock price.110 It is not difficult to imagine a hedge fund holding a 
significant stake in a bank pressuring the bank’s board of directors to enter 
the subprime-lending sector in order to enjoy share price gains comparable 
to those seen at competing banks. The message is clear: if increased 
shareholder access equates to corporations managing to the market, 
extremely unwise business decisions may follow. This suggests that the 
“solution” may be a different way of arriving at the same problem. It is 
ironic indeed that the recent financial crisis is offered as an impetus for 
shareholder access when proxy reform presents the danger of leading to 
the very same result. 
The foregoing illustrates that increasing shareholder power, which is to 
say hedge fund power, may lead to directors managing to the market.111 
Reuniting control with ownership may thus lead directors to ignore the 
informational advantages they enjoy over shareholders because they can 
be forced, whether by proxy contest or “the power to intervene,”112 to 
acquiesce to hedge fund demands. In other words, the message may be 
that “the directors should ignore their own business judgment.”113 Given 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 700-01. 
110 Id. at 720 (Fig. 3).  
111 Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that directors, or at 
least management directors, may currently have incentives aligned with hedge funds as a 
result of equity compensation. See, e.g., Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to 
Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' 
Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
971, 986, 994-1000 (2004) (arguing that “the internal design of equity-based 
compensation, generally, and fixed-price stock options, specifically, promotes corporate 
‘short-termism’ and not long-term productivity”). While this fact may lead one to argue 
that management already has the perverse incentive to manage to the market—an 
argument to be taken seriously—it can properly be dealt with by placing greater 
regulation on a manager’s ability to sell his or her shares. Id. at 994-97 (noting short-
termism caused by lack of holding requirements). 
112 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
113 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 712.  
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these considerations, the SEC should be hesitant to alter the current 
balance of power, as “[t]he prevailing legal model works differently 
because it instructs the directors to maximize the value of the 
‘corporation’ and not the stock price.”114 This danger, presented by 
maximizing the share price in place of the value of the corporation, should 
not be taken lightly. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The SEC has responded to the recent financial crisis by proposing rule 
changes designed to hold directors accountable and increase shareholder 
value. In proposing these changes, the SEC has proven itself ignorant of 
the current mix of factors affecting director elections and corporate 
performance. Because the current landscape provides sufficient 
opportunities for shareholders to hold boards accountable, proxy reform is 
an unnecessary evil that threatens long-term shareholder value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 Id.; see also Olson, supra note 96, at 303-04 (“[The current SEC proposals] create 
a substantial risk that boards of directors and CEOs will no longer see themselves as 
primarily responsible for the direction and success of the enterprise, but rather as mere 
agents implementing shareholder decisions.”). 
